There’s an utterly fascinating (and extremely difficult) exchange about the nature of comparative virtues going on at What’s Wrong With the World. It has expanded from the original post, which condemns consequentialist ethics through a recounting of the story of Sir Bors and the lady in the tower, and is covering a heck of a lot of ground as the comments unfold.
The basic problem proposed is this:
Person X (in this case a ravishingly beautiful woman) has told you (in this case a stalwart knight) that, unless you sleep with her – committing the mortal sin of fornication – she will die. It gradually unfolds that this is a sort of curse/mania that will see her fling herself from the tower if her wishes are not fulfilled, but still, the consequences remain the same: she will die if you don’t sleep with her.
Sir Bors, knowing full well that it’s a terrible thing to let oneself be held hostage by another’s evil intentions, declares that he’s very sorry, but he can’t, in fact, oblige her.
But the lady ups the ante. So desperate is she to have her way that she declares – quite truthfully so far as Sir Bors knows – that, if he does not do as she says, she will drag twelve other (so far) innocent ladies off the tower with her. Well then; what does he say to that?
There we have the question: thirteen lives saved at the cost of one man’s personal sin. What should the virtuous man do?
There are two schools of thought manifesting themselves in the comments, and, while I am quite sure about what the true answer to this question is, it’s a mark of the eloquence of those involved that to read those comments is to experience something of the see-saw motion that I thought I had left behind forever on the schoolyards of yore. Both sides make compelling points, and it’s a pleasure – if often a harrowing one – to see this thing treated with such high seriousness.
On the one hand, we find the firm resolution to commit no sin, if it can be avoided; the only souls for which we are entirely responsible are our own, and, while we are bidden to save lives and help people whenever it is possible, we are not given sanction to commit evil acts in our attempts to do so. There is no assurance at all that sleeping with the woman will save her life or prevent her from murdering the other twelve, for both curses and manipulative murderesses are notoriously untrustworthy.
On the other hand, it is true that we are a fallen race, of which “none is righteous – no, not one.” What right have we to privilege our own perceived (yet essentially non-existent) sanctity or righteousness over the lives of others? What if all thirteen of those ladies – the voracious one and the victims both – would later come to a full repentance, but our unwillingness to save their lives through one easily-repented sin sent them to perdition before their time? How might we account for that before the Throne?
Now, I don’t really subscribe to some of the rhetoric (on both sides) declaring that the souls of the other are clearly forfeit because of their positions, but I do think one side is demonstrably wrong. I subscribe to the “let her jump” position in this debate, and, while I respect the motives of the “save them all” side, I think there’s a sort of sentimentalism at play in it that will lead to far greater problems than it immediately solves.
It has long been the position of certain hawkish theorists that one “should under no circumstances negotiate with terrorists.” However hubristic and boastful it may be in the cases of one given hawk or another, it is, in the end, a sensible – if often heartbreaking – approach to the problem; indeed, the only response to it that has any chance of ending the tactic rather than just the situation. To show a willingness to be swayed by threats of this type is simply to invite them again and again in the future, and in a constantly escalating fashion.
One pleasingly long comment in particular lays this out very well; a theologically-oriented passage from it follows:
I can imagine the exchange going on between God, the Father, and the Devil when Jesus hung on the Cross:
Devil: If you do just this one thing for me, I’ll let your Son live.
God: [Silence]
Devil: Do you want to see your only-begotten Son suffer? Surely, doing this one little thing for me isn’t so bad. Think of all of the lives he could touch if he lived. Think of how much he would impress the people. I can see the headline, now:
Man Comes Down off of Cross….the People Taunted, He Proved Them Wrong
Don’t you see the hope this would give millions of others hanging on their crosses. Maybe they might be another lucky one. How can you be so cruel?
God: [Silence]
Devil: I see you’re a hard one to please. Look, I’ll even spare his twelve apostles. You know they will all die horrible deaths, otherwise.
God: [Silence]
Devil: Okay, have it your way, but I’m not the one letting your Son die, you are.
God: [Silence and a smile]
As charged as this example is (and the rest of his comment is much more down-to-earth, so to speak), the implications of it should be inescapable: when once we allow our will – especially our will to virtue – to be guided by those who are specifically threatening us or others with harm, it’s only a matter of time before our deliberate subordination to them becomes the norm rather than a one-time exception born of circumstance. Sure, we may only have to do X to prevent Y, the first time; but the next time it’s X+1, and then X+2, and so on, and so on, until we make a holocaust of the world to save the things we love the most. It’s similar to the question of omens, in a way; we may at first look for signs in a neutral sort of manner, hoping for the good and fearing the bad, but the practical consequence really is that we’ll see bad omens everywhere. Our efforts to cheat virtue and find the easy way out of our troubles always lead to greater troubles in the end.
Now, I said above that the only souls for which we’re entirely responsible are our own, but that doesn’t mean that this is the only responsibility we bear. We are bidden by scripture not to provide occasions of sin for others, even if we can’t absolutely save their souls by our own effort; the one without scruples should give way to the one who has them. It would be both cruel and dangerous to drink ostentatiously in the company of a recovering alcoholic, or to exhibit match-tricks to a struggling pyromaniac, or to speak lightly of property rights to a kleptomaniac, or to casually nibble upon a man before a cannibalistic psychopath (this latter is rather extreme, I’ll grant). The point is that we should be careful not to knowingly provide opportunities for the people we meet to stumble into sins that particularly afflict them, whatever the rights our personal liberty guarantees may or may not be. I have a right to drink whenever and wherever I like, arguably, but I should restrain myself before the alcoholic out of courtesy to his condition and regard for his soul.
In the same way, succumbing to the demands of the terrorist – whether he be a bomb-wielding man or a sex-wielding woman – only provokes future indulgences in his or her particular sin. The knowledge that he can exact policy changes by threatening to blow up a landmark has emboldened many a man, and closed his eyes to virtue; the knowledge that she can get sexual satisfaction from whomever she wants by threatening murder might embolden the woman in question, and pull her still farther from a repentance and a reconciliation that admittedly seem very far away indeed. “It was so easy,” each of them might think; “what else can I get?”
It is a hard thing to say that you would let the woman – and her twelve hapless victims – perish to preserve your own virtue, but it isn’t just your own virtue that’s at stake. It’s souls, and Virtue as an incarnate concept – yours, hers, everyone’s – and she would be more likely to be damned by the sin of willful fornication than she would be by unwilling suicide.
But seriously, it’s not easy. Almost exactly a year ago (minus two weeks), I candidly affirmed the exact opposite position:
For my own part, shameful as it is, I would probably murder the man and save the billions, thereafter spending the rest of my life in repentence.
This might, then, be a very interesting moment in the history of our awareness of hypocrisy and its nature. I affirm entirely the position I’ve spent the last 1500 words presenting, but I also recognize that – if it were to come down to the practical business – I’d probably be just as bad as anyone.
Take from all this what you will.


